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ARGUMENT
I.

THURSTON HOLDS THAT INPUT FROM NEIGHBORING
LANDOWNERS IS PROPER BUT UNDUE RELIANCE ON SUCH INPUT
MAY NOT BE THE CRITERION FOR THE DENIAL OF THE PERMIT.
The City relies on Thurston v. Cache Coun!J to support its assertion that public clamor

must be based on discriminatory intent or serious procedural misconduct. Ibid., 626 P.2d 440

(Utah, 1981); Appellants' Supplemental Brief

at

pp. 1-2. However, Thurston's holdings are

supportive to existing public clamor law in Utah.
Thurston involves Cache County's denial of conditional use permits to build residences

in an agricultural area. Id. at 442. Cache County developed a numerical evaluation system,
assigning or denying points to a conditional use pennit application on certain criteria. Id. at
443. The request was first denied by the county planning commission and upheld by the board
of county commissioners. Id. In the trial court found the denial was based on 1) lack of points,
2) objections from adjacent landowners, 3) considerations of health, safety, and general welfare
of persons residing in the vicinity, and 4) soil type. Id. The board of county commissioners
similarly denied it on 1) lack of points, 2) access road problems, 3) lack of community services,
4) soil type, and 5) lack of confonnity with the basic policy of the master plan. Id.
On appeal, Thurstons argued denial of equal protection stating the ordinance provided
insufficient guidelines or standards for issuance or denial of conditional use pennits. Id. at 444.
Thurston found the planning commission was empowered by ordinance to issue/ deny

conditional use permits, guided by the numerical evaluation system, unless it detrimental to
the health, safety, or general welfare of the persons residing in the vicinity, or injurious to
property. Id. "Such statutory standards adequately channel the discretionary activities of the

Planning Commission, and do not support a claim of denial of equal protection." Id.

Thurston held that plaintiffs presented no evidence that the Cache County Planning
Commission's decision was "illegal.1, discriminatory, or an abuse of discretion." Id. It found
that denial of the permits was based on the numerical evaluation system, together with
numerous other factors pertinent to the desirability and ultimate benefit of the proposed uses,
"all of which constitute a legitimate exercise of governmental authority in the enactment of
the ordinance in question." Id.

Thurston also addressed "undue reliance on objections filed by the landowners in the
vicinity" stating, "[w]hile it is true that the consent of neighboring landowners may not be
made a criterion for the issuance or denial or a conditional use permit, there is no impropriety
in the solicitation of, or reliance upon, infonnation which may be furnished by other

landowners in the vicinity of the subject property at a public hearing." Id. at 445. ''There is
ample evidence to suggest that the input of neighboring landowners in the instant case was of

this advisory nature." Id. Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines "advisory'' as "having the
power or right to make suggestions about what should be done: able to give advice." ,v,v,v.mw.com, "advisory", accessed March 8, 2017.
In detennining the issue of ''uridue reliance" upon the objections from neighboring
landowners, Thurston relies upon Parker v. Zoning Bd. ofReview ofCi!] ofEast Providence, 156 A.2d
210 (R.I. 1959) which states, "[a]fter considering the evidence we cannot say that the board

1

It should be noted the denial of the permit at issue in Thurston was held to a different standard
of review that has been replaced by UTAH CODE .ANN. §10-9a-801(3), which requires the
detennination of only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation is arbitrary,
capricious, or illegal.
2

abused their discretion in finding that it did not indicate to them that the proposed gasoline

filling station would serve the public convenience and welfare." Id. at 212. Parker noted it gave
"no weight to the second ground of the decision, namely, 'That all of the abutting residential
property owners objected' to the granting of the application." Id. at 213. "If the board's
decision rested solely on such ground we would have no hesitancy in holding that it would be
an abuse of their discretion.'' Id. ".A mere poll of the neighboring landowners does not serve
to assist the board in detennining whether the exception applied or is consistent with the
public convenience or welfare or whether it will tend to devaluate the neighboring property."
Id. citingfatYJues v. Zoning Board of Review, 64 R.I. 284, 12 A.2d 222; Sundlun v. Zoning Board of

Review, 50 R.I. 108, 145 A. 451.
The City argues Thurston ''held that it is appropriate that a local government hear and
rely upon [adverse public comment]." Appellant's Supplemental brief at p. 4. In reality,
Thurston is valid law respecting the public clamor doctrine, which this Court and the Utah

Court of Appeals has determined cannot be the sole basis to deny a conditional use pennit,
which is discussed post but also supported by Thurston.
The McElhaneys abided by every orclinance required by the 1M1v.[C to obtain the Permit
as argued in the Brief ofAppellee. As a result, the McElhaneys believe the City's discretionary
activities were insufficiently tailored to adequately deny the Pennit on grounds other than
public clamor. Here, the denial of the Pennit was an illegitimate exercise of governmental
authority.
The City was pennitted to consider information furnished by the neighboring land
owners if provided on an "advisory" basis, as opposed to evidentiary one. Thurston at 445.

3

Neighboring landowner consent is not a criterion for the issuance or denial of the Pennit Id.
The input by neighboring landowners in Thurston was "advisory" because the numerical
evaluation system put in place by Cache County, together with other factors pertinent to
desirability and ultimate benefit of the proposed use, was the evidence in the record. Id. at 444-

4445.
Herein, the adverse public comment was not taken as "advisory" but rather as
evidentiary and dispositive in an improper delegation of the Council's decision-making power.
Id. at 445. The Council explicitly stated on the record that the neighborhood was dearly not

interested in allowing the Pennit, the primary concern of residents being to preserve the
"character of the town", and that the ordinance at issue explicitly allowed the Council to "listen
to the people in the neighborhoods and to do what the neighborhoods wished." R381-383.
These statements evidence that the public testimony was wrongfully taken by the Council as
evidentiary and dispositive (i.e. public clamor) rather than "advisory", which was thus an
application of improper public clamor as it is defined by Utah law.
Thurston's holdings relied on Parker, which holdings support Utah's public clamor
doctrine. Parker involved several factors of denial of a pennit, only one of which was based
on the objections of the neighboring landowners. The Parker court explicitly stated that the
governing body's decision would be an abuse of discretion if it solely rested on the grounds
of neighboring landowner objections. Parker at 213. Parker supports later Utah law directing
that the denial of a conditional use permit must be based on sufficient evidence, because ''a
mere poll of the neighboring landowners does not serve to assist the board in determining
whether the exception applied for is consistent with the public convenience or welfare or

4

whether it will tend to devaluate the neighboring property." Id. (emphasis added). Thurston and
Parker constitute valid law concerning the doctrine of public clamor.
II.

FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS ARE NOT INFRINGED WHERE AN
OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK IS PROVIDED; AND SUCH FREEDOMS DO
NOT ENTITLE THE SPEAKERS TO ACTION IN CONFORMITY WITH
THEIR OPINIONS.
''The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that Congress 'shall

make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."' Gallivan

v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, ,r 105, 54 P.3d 1069 (citations omitted) .
.Appellant argues that U.S. CONST. AMEND. I is infringed upon by application of
Thurston Coun!J and the public clamor doctrine to conditional land use permits. Their

supplemental brief argues that "the boundaries of the public clamor doctrine must be clearly
defined so that fundamental First Amendment freedoms to speak and, more importantly, to
have one's concerns acted upon, are not displaced by a de facto exclusionary rule as to public
testimony." See, ibid. at p. 5. Appellant further argues that Appellee urges this type of rule. Id.,

citing Response Brief, p. 45.
Appellee does not seek to exclude public testimony in these types of matters, nor does
the reference to the Response Brief support this contention. Appellee seeks to uphold Utah
law that a land use pennit decision cannot rest solely on public testimony or clamor. Appellant
had their opportunity to address, or petition, their local government and be heard in exercise
of their rights under the First .Amendment. However, they have provided no authority-and
none exists-to indicate that the First Amendment rights include the ''right to have one's
concerns acted upon" as they allege in their supplemental brie£ A local government council
5

maintruns authority to consider public testimony as "advisory" but not evidentiary and
dispositive, and such consideration must be in concert with other more appropriate factors
for making the determination on a conditional land use pennit. This rule in no way infringes
upon the First Amendment rights of neighboring landowners, as further argued post.

III.

THE CORRECT STANDARD TO DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF THE

DENIAL OF THE CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT IS WHETHER THE
DECISION TO DO SO WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, OR ILLEGAL.
In an appeal from a municipality's land use decision, "[t]he courts shall: (i) presume
that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the authority of this chapter is valid; and
(ri) determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation is arbitrary, capricious,

or illegal." UT.AH CODE.ANN. §10-9a-801(3).
The McEihaneys have relied upon 'Ralph L Wadsworth Construction, Inc. v. West Jordian

Ci!J due to its holding that, "[b]ecause the decision to deny an application for a conditional
use permit may not be based solely on adverse public comment, ... , we conclude this finding
is insufficient to support the City Council's denial of appellants' application." Ibid., 2000 UT
App. 49,117, 999 P.2d 1240 (emphasis added); see Davis Coun!J v. Clearfield Ci!J, 756 P.2d 704,
711-12 (Utah App.1988). Thus, the &lph court found a decision "arbitrary and capricious"
where not supported by evidence. Id. at ,I18.
The City argues the Public Clamor Doctrine can only be applied when procedural
misconduct or discrimination occurs. This Court is only tasked with determining whether or
not the decision to deny the conditional use permit was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. UTAH
CODE .ANN. §10-9a-801(3). The Council arbitrarily and capriciously denied the Permit for the
sole reason of adverse public comment, rendering its decision unsupported by evidence. Ralph

6

at ,r17. This Court must detennine whether the evidence is sufficient to support the denial,
and whether the consideration of public clamor as the sole reason to deny the Permit is
properly undertaken, regardless of whether the clamor was based on procedural misconduct
or discrimination. Therefore, the City's request to alter Utah law should be dismissed
forthright as it contradicts the established standard of review.
IV.

THE

PUBLIC

CLAMOR

DOCTRINE.

IS

ONE

METHOD

OF

DETERMINING WHETHER THE DENIAL WAS ARBITRARY,
CAPRICIOUS, OR ILLEGAL BECAUSE IT CANNOT BE THE SOLE
BASIS TO DENY A CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT.
The City argues the public clamor doctrine has been applied when procedural
misconduct or discrimination occurs. However, precedent indicates that public clamor cannot
be the sole basis to reject the application, and it has not been applied as posed by the City.
The City cites to Ci!J of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center as grounds that public clamor
cannot be based on discrimination. Ibid., 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed. 313 (1985).
However, it misinterprets Cleb11T1Je, which involved a living center that desired to lease a certain
building for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded. Id., 473 U.S. at 432, 105
S.Ct. at 3250. The center was advised a special use pennit was required but was denied after a
public hearing. Id. The center filed suit, alleging the zoning ordinance violated the Equal
Protection rights of the facility and its potential residents. Id. Thus, Cleburne analyzed whether
mental retardation was a quasi-suspect class under the Equal Protection clause. Id., 473 U.S.
at 433-447, 105 S.Ct. at 3251-3258. Cleburne found the city did not require a special use permit
in this particular zone for other housing or hospital-type developments. Id., 473 U.S. at 447,
105 S.Ct. at 3258. Even though the "mentally retarded" as a group are different from others,
" ... this difference is largely irrelevant unless the Featherston home and those who would
7

occupy it would threaten legitimate interests of the city in a way that other permitted uses such
as boarding houses and hospitals would not." Id., 473 U.S. at 448, 105 S.Ct. at 3258. The court
found no rational basis that the Featherston home would pose any special threat to the city's
legitimate interests, and affinned that the ordinance was invalid as applied. Id.

Cleburne noted the denial of the permit rested on several factors by the city, including
the negative attitude of the majority of property owners located withln 200 feet of the
proposed facility, as well as with the fears of elderly residents of the neighborhood. Id., 473
U.S. at 447, 105 S.Ct. at 3259. "But mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors
which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a
home for the mentally retarded differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the

a

like." Id. ''It is plain that the electorate as whole, whether by referendum or otherwise, could
not order city action violative of the Equal Protection Clause, ... , and the City may not avoid
the strictures of that Clause by deferring to the wishes or objections of some fraction of the
body politic." Id. (citation omitted). "'Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but
the law cannot, directly or indirectly~ give them effect."' Id. citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,

433, 104 S.Ct. 1879, 1882, 80 L.Ed.2d 421 (1984). Cleburne rejected the denial of the pennit on
the grounds the facility was too closely located to

a junior high, there might be overcrowding

of persons living in the facility, and congestion in the stre~ts, finding these grounds were
insufficient because the other uses freely permitted in the zone and neighborhood were
granted without similar concern or restriction. Id., 473 U.S. at 449-450, 105 S.Ct. at 3259-3260.

Cleburne was challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, but provides similar guidance on
the public clamor doctrine as is found in Utah-it cannot be the sole basis of the denial of a

8

conditional use pennit

In Ralph, supra, the Utah Court of Appeals found public clamor was the sole basis for
the denial of the conditional use permit when the city denied the application on two (2)
grounds, to wit 1) ''[t]he city has made a significant investment in bringing Dannon to the
area and ... [o]utdoor storage is detrimental to the area ... and injurious to the goals of the city";
and 2) appellants' outdoor storage "may be considered ... a nuisance". Ibid. at ,Mf17-18. Ralph
found the only support in the record were concerns expressed by the neighboring landowners.

Id. There was no evidence of actual investigation into the specific concerns raised by the public
or what reasons lead to these conclusions; accordingly, Ralph was reversed because the denial
was not based on the sufficient factual basis, rendering it arbitrary and capricious. Id. at ,I19.
Similarly, Davis Coun!J v. Clearfield Ci-!J detennined, ''[e]ven if the reasons given in the
motion adopted by the council might otherwise be legally sufficient... the denial of a permit is
arbitrary when the reasons are without sufficient factual basis." Ibid., 756 P.2d 704, 711 (Utah
App. 1988); see, e.g., CR lnvs., Inc. v. Village

of Shoreview, 304 N.W.2d 320 (]Minn.1981). Davis

involved the proposed operation of a residential treatment program for youth and adults
suffering from substance abuse; however, public hearing yielded concerns about parking,
increased crime, and reduction of property values. Id. at 705. Davis relied on Shoreview, Thurston,

Board of Coun!J Comm'rs v. Teton Coun!J Youth Servs. Inc., 652 P.2d 400, 411 (Wyo.1982), Ci!J of
Barnum v. Coun!J of Carlton, 386 N.W.2d 770, and Chanhassen Estates Residents Ass'n v. City of
Chanhassen, 342 N.W.2d 335, 340 (]Minn.1984) for the detennination that public clamor cannot
be the sole basis to deny the permit Id. at 711-712. As held by Chanhassen, "denial of a

9

conditional use must be based on something more concrete than neighborhood opposition
and expressions of concern for public safety and welfare." Ibid. at 340.
Herein, the doctrine of public clamor has a broad definition because there must be
sufficient grounds and evidence to deny an application for a conditional use permit A
governing body cannot reject an application because neighboring land owners object Such
circwnstances are readily apparent in cases like Cleburne, where pennits for similar facilities
were regularly granted in that particular zone, and the denial was rooted in adverse public
opinion. Denial is inappropriate where a governing body has failed to sufficiently find grounds
in the evidence to deny the application and the flimsy reasons to do so are found in adverse

public comment. Accordingly, "mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors
which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases" for denying
the Pennit., which is what happened herein. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447, 105 S.Ct. at 3259.
The only findings given on the record by the Council to deny the Permit were in the
concerns expressed by neighboring ·landowners, which had been investigated by City staff at
the planning commission stage of the application and recommended for approval after
investigation. Similar to Ralph, the denial in this case was not based on sufficient factual basis,
which constitutes an arbitrary and capricious denial of the Permit. Ibid. at ~17-19.
Moreover, even if this case does not amount to public clamor, the denial must still be
based on a "sufficient factual basis," which is lacking herein. Davis at 711. The denial in this
case "must be based on something more concrete than neighborhood opposition and
expressions of concern for public safety and welfare." Davis at 711-712 citing Chanhassen at 340.
The McElhaneys complied with all of the requirements of the ordinance and the directives of

10

the planning commission. The McElhaneys have been unable to find anything more concrete
to support the denial other than neighborhood opposition, which is insufficient. Id.
Accordingly, Utah law on the public clamor doctrine applies to require evidentiary and factual
support in the record to support a denial of the conditional use permit, not special
circumstances as .Appellants argue.
\

V.

THE DOCTRINE OF PUBLIC CLAMOR DOES NOT APPLY TO
LEGISLATIVE DECISIONS BUT DOES APPLY TO ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISIONS TO DENY A CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT.
The City argues in a footnote, "this Court has recogni2ed that a local government may

properly rely upon all manner of public testimony when it acts in a legislative context, such as
a rezoning decision." Appellant's Supplemental Briefat p. 2, fn. 1. The City cites to Gt!Jland v. Salt

Lzke Coun'!), 358 P.2d 633, 635-636 (Utah, 1961). However, the public clamor doctrine does
not apply to legislative decisions made by government bodies, and therefore the reliance on
public opinion for legislative actions has no bearing on the case at hand.
In the case of Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, the Utah Court of Appeals analyzed both

Davis Coun'!) v. Clearfield Ci9 and Gay/and. Ibid., 2000 UT App. 31, ,I26, 997 P.2d 321. "In relying
on Davis Coun'!), however, Hannon incorrectly equates review of the administrative decision
to deny a conditional use pennit with review of a legislative act." Id. "Although both actions
are reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard, a city may rely on the concerns of
interested citizens when perfonning legislative functions." Id. "As Gay/and points out, the
public clamor doctrine has no application when a legislative body acts in a legislative capacity.
We thus conclude that the Draper City Council was not required to disregard the concerns of
its electorate--or its own concerns-when perfonning in a legislative capacity." Id. at ,I27 citing

11

Gay/and at 635-636. The City's point is completely moot pursuant to the holdings of Harmon.

VI.

THE DOCTRINE OF PUBLIC CLAMOR IS CLEAR, DOES NOT
REQUIRE ADDITIONAL DEFINITION, AND WAS ERRONEOUSLY
RELIED UPON BY THE CITY TO DENY THE CONDITIONAL USE
PERMIT.
The City argues clarification of Thurston is appropriate because lower courts misapply

it in a manner that infringes on the First Amendment. The City believes Ralph evidences that
lower courts are applying the concept of public clamor to infringe upon "the constitutionally
mandated right to petition." Id. at pp. 4-5. However, Thurston and 'Ralph both allow for public
comment, but hold that adverse public comment cannot be the sole basis of the denial of a
conditional use permit. Thurston at 445 (neighboring landowner consent cannot be a criterion
for issuance/denial; however, the council can solicit and rely on information furnished by
neighboring landowners in an advisory role); Ralph at iJ17 (''Because the decision to deny an
application for a conditional use permit may not be based solely on adverse public
comment ... we conclude this finding is insufficient to support the City Council's denial of
appellants' application."). There is no hypothetical chilling effect on First Amendment rights.
Moreover, the City is correct in a broader sense that bias or improper purpose, serious
procedural misconduct, and discrimination may constitute public clamor. However, the City
wishes to improperly narrow the definition of public clamor to only these occurrences, when
this Court has not seen fit to do so previously and there is no support for doing so now.
The City has not presented any legal authority, law or statute, argument, or analysis of
the legal authority or law to support its claims to this effect Rather, the City relies on bold
assertions and far-sweeping unsupported argument The City's arguments should therefore be
declined on this basis alone. See, State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App. 170, iJ13, 72 P.3d 138 ("Briefs
12

must contain reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal authority. An issue is inadequately
briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research
and argument to the reviewing court.").
The McElhaneys' BriefofAppellee fully sets forth the adverse public comment relied on
by the City in denying the pennit, briefly summarized as follows: Councilwoman Peterson

cited to the General Plan to deny the Pennit; however, she then stated, "[a]nd in this specific
instance in this zone, I feel like what we're being asked to do is to force a commercial business

o:a a mside:atial uea that cleuly is noti:aterested i:a cn:at:ing a commercialzone." R381,
In. 11-15 (emphasis added). Councilwoman Ershadi stated that, in her campaign, the p.timuy

concem voiced by .residents to her at that time was the chuacte.r ofthe town R382.
Councilwoman Ershadi stated the character of the town was tied with economic opportunity
because a huge concern was the nightly rentals in town were talcing over and less space

belonged to the local mside:ats. Id. Councilman Bailey stated he was the chairman of the
land commission that wrote the ordinance allowing bed and breakfasts to be allowed in the R2 zone. R383. Councilman Bailey stated they allowed overnight rentals in the R-3 zone and

"we tried to open it so that there was some opportunity for R2s to get into a business, a bed
and breakfast". Id. Couoci)mao Bailey stated the clear intent behind the zoning ordinances was
to "listen to the people in the neighborhoods a:ad to do what tbe neighbo.t:hoods wished

a:ad that's why we bad that- clearly mirumal negative impact on adjacent residential areas,
so I think we've seen what this is going to be an impact on the neighborhoods and I can't
support this." Id, In. 13-18 (emphasis added).
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The City argues adverse public comment was "quite specific" respecting projected
increase in traffic and noise emissions from off-highway vehicles that ''would likely exceed
City noise ordinance levels." Appellant's Supplemental Briefat p. 9. However, these concerns were
completely mitigated by the McElhaneys. As to traffic, city staff detennined traffic would
decrease with the closure of the daycare. R261. As to noise, the City staff determined that,
since the owners reside on the premises, noise is less of a concern. Id. As to off-highway
vehicle noise, the operation of such vehicles is confined to certalll areas by city ordinance and
State laws. Public clamor was mere speculation that B&B guests would violate such ordinance
to ride their A TVs in the immediate neighborhood. Should such guests do so, the conditional
use permit is reviewed every year. None of the citizens "concerns" were supported by evidence
and were refuted by the city staff and planning commission. The City's arguments actually
demonstrate public clamor as the sole basis to deny the conditional use pennit
The overall sentiment from the City Council was rooted in adverse comment &om the
public, which is arbitrary and capricious. The determination to deny the Application is not
required to amount to some sort of misconduct, bias, or prejudice against the McElhaneys.
Adverse public comment cannot be the sole reason to deny the permit, which was the case
here. The doctrine of public clamor does not need to change, narrow, or be redefined; rather,
the City Council should not be allowed to deny conditional use pennits on the sole basis that
the public is adverse to the use. The denial cannot stand because it is not based upon sufficient
facts or evidence. The district court should therefore be affirmed.
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VII.

MCELHANEYS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
PURSUANT TO UT. R. APP. P. 33.
UT. R. APP. P. 33(a) states that " ... if a court determines that a[n] ... appeal taken under

these rules is . . . frivolous ... , it shall award just damages, which may include single or double
costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/ or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party.'' UT. R.
.APP. P. 33(b) provides a definition staring, "[f]or the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal

... is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or nor based on a good
faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law."
Appellants did not support their public clamor below with any evidence, and seek to alter
long-standing precedent on appeal to support their lack of evidence below. They make
frivolous First .Amendment claims when existing law provides First .Amendment protections,
which they received. They have not made a good faith argument to extend, modify or reverse
the precedent on public clamor, but instead have erroneously charged Appellees with
attempting to exclude public input altogether. Appellees seek only to uphold existing law and
categorize public clamor appropriately. Appellant's briefs are not grounded in fact, not
warranted by precedent, and are inadequate to alter existing law. Thus, they are frivolous and
Appellees are entitled to attorney fees on appeal. UT. R. APP. P. 33(a) and (b).

CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, the McElhaneys respectfully request this
Court affirm the Decision entered by the district court.
DATED this 9th day of March, 2017.

_j s/ Craig C. Halls
CRAIG C. 1-L\LLS
Attorney for Jaremy and Mary
McElhaney, Appellees
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